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would be a most fitting introduction to philosophy, not merely for the college student, but for the whole community of educated men. Such a work should, as far as possible, avoid the expression of individual opinion, but in other respects its method would resemble that rejected by Professor Külpe.

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THE WILL TO BELIEVE, and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy.

By WILLIAM JAMES. New York, London, and Bombay: Longmans, Green & Co., 1897. Pp. xvii + 332, 8vo. Cloth, \$2.

THE contents of this volume do not belie its title. It is truly described as a series of "essays in popular philosophy." Whatever Professor James touches he popularizes, just because whatever he touches he humanizes. The same qualities of sympathetic insight, of poetic imagination, of subtle humor, of rare style, which are familiar to readers of the *Principles of Psychology*, characterize in an even more marked degree the present volume, and entitle it, even more unmistakably than its predecessor, to rank as literature. The charm of the author's personality pervades the book, and, whether we agree with his conclusions or not, we cannot help feeling that it is good for us to have made the acquaintance of such a soul as that which finds expression in it. Nor is the epithet "popular" to be interpreted in the sense which the author's modesty intends it to carry. Although the language is untechnical, the thought is severe in its logical sequence; and, although a brilliant fancy plays round the discussion, and relieves it of all scholastic dryness, the discussion itself always sounds the subject to its depths. Besides, while the volume consists of a series of papers already published at intervals extending over nearly twenty years, it represents a unity of standpoint and of treatment no less rich than if the essays had been written continuously and in the same year. The persistence with which Professor James has preached his philosophic creed from different texts through all these years can only add to the respect with which it is received by readers of the present volume.

That creed is entitled by the author himself "radical empiricism," and is opposed by him to "monism," whether of the gnostic or agnostic, of the idealistic or materialistic, sort. "I say 'empiricism,' because it is contented to regard its most assured conclusions concerning matters of fact as hypotheses liable to modification in the course of future experi-

ence ; and I say 'radical,' because it treats the doctrine of monism itself as an hypothesis, and unlike so much of the half-way empiricism that is current under the name of positivism, or agnosticism, or scientific naturalism, it does not dogmatically affirm monism as something with which all experience has got to square." (Preface.) Radical empiricism is, therefore, for Professor James synonymous with pluralism, as rationalism is synonymous with monism. "After all that reason can do has been done, there still remains the opacity of the finite facts as merely given, with most of their peculiarities mutually unmediated and unexplained. To the very last, there are the various 'points of view' which the philosopher must distinguish in discussing the world ; and what is inwardly clear from one point remains a bare externality and datum to the other. The negative, the alogical, is never wholly banished." (Preface.) The argument for radical empiricism is the argument from the whole of experience as against the argument from its parts, or from some of them. The alternative is between an incomplete and a complete anthropomorphism. The parts of experience which are sacrificed in all monistic schemes, whether transcendental or naturalistic, are the affective and the volitional, while exclusive consideration is given to the intellectual. A total and unprejudiced view of human experience, on the other hand, discovers that knowledge, no less than affection, is subordinate in importance to, and exists for the sake of, life and activity.

Thus the philosophy which the author ultimately reaches is a moral and æsthetic idealism, as opposed to a merely intellectual idealism. Like Mr. Balfour, in his *Foundations of Belief*, Professor James insists upon the needs of the heart and of the life, and is willing to sacrifice intellectual to moral and æsthetic satisfaction. The result is an impressive plea for the rights of the moral and religious consciousness, for the validity of our judgments of worth as well as our judgments of fact. "A nameless *Unheimlichkeit* comes over us at the thought of there being nothing eternal in our final purposes, in the objects of those loves and aspirations which are our deepest energies. The monstrously lop-sided equation of the universe and its knower, which we postulate as the ideal of cognition, is perfectly paralleled by the no less lop-sided equation of the universe and the *doer*. We demand in it a character for which our emotions and active propensities shall be a match. Small as we are, minute as is the point by which the cosmos impinges upon each one of us, each one desires to feel that his reaction at that point is congruous with the demands of the vast

whole—that he balances the latter, so to speak, and is able to do what it expects of him." (Pp. 83-4.)

The resulting view of the universe is optimistic, spiritual, and theistic. The opposite view—the pessimistic, the materialistic, and the pantheistic—is invalidated from the standpoint of feeling and will. The "will to believe" in a personal God justifies itself to the human will, if not to the human intellect; the "reflex action" of theistic belief is no less natural, and therefore no less valid, than any other and lower form of reflex action or reaction. The "essential features" of such a theistic belief are, first, "that God be conceived as the deepest power in the universe; and, second, he must be conceived under the form of a mental personality. . . . A power not ourselves, then, which not only makes for righteousness, but means it, and which recognizes us—such is the definition which I think nobody will be inclined to dispute. . . . In whatever other respects the divine personality may differ from ours or may resemble it, the two are consanguineous at least in this, that both have purposes for which they care, and each can hear the other's call." (P. 122.)

Two things will doubtless call forth critical attacks upon the general position thus outlined. First, Professor James gives to the term "empiricism" such a novel and rich connotation as to make it include a moral and æsthetic, if not a merely intellectual, idealism; a total, if not a merely partial, synthesis of the elements of human experience. The author would doubtless, however, insist that his philosophy is still empirical, inasmuch as it is pluralistic, and the synthesis remains rationally incomplete. Secondly, the theoretical and the practical problem, it will be urged, are not always distinguished. While it is true that "the entire man, who feels all needs by turns, will take nothing as an equivalent for life but the fullness of living itself" (p. 69), yet the theoretic need is no less real than the practical, and it is often necessary to distinguish them. This objection is also anticipated by the author, who reminds us in his preface that his sermon was, in each case, determined by the needs of his audiences, which, being academic, had been "fed already on science," and were hungering for the gospel of "the liberty of believing." That gospel is impressively summed up in the following passage from the essay on "Reflex Action and Theism": "From its first dawn to its highest actual attainment, we find that the cognitive faculty, where it appears to exist at all, appears but as one element in an organic mental whole, and as a minister to higher mental powers—the powers of will. Such a thing as its eman-

cipation from these organic relations receives no faintest color of plausibility from any fact we can discern. . . . This is nothing new. All men know it at those rare moments when the soul sobers herself, and leaves off her chattering and protesting and insisting about this formula and that. In the silence of our theories we then seem to listen, and to hear something like the pulse of Being beat; and it is borne in upon us that the mere turning of the character, the dumb willingness to suffer and to serve this universe, is more than all theories about it put together. The most any theory about it can do is to bring us to that." (Pp. 140-41.)

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TWO LECTURES ON THEISM (Princeton Lectures). By ANDREW SETH. New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1897. Pp. ii + 64; 12mo. \$1.

THESE lectures, delivered on the occasion of the sesqui-centennial celebration of Princeton University, come appropriately from the Scottish fatherland, which has been the source of so much of the philosophy taught in America, and with especial appropriateness from the incumbent of Sir William Hamilton's chair at Edinburgh. For the standpoint taken, though based on other grounds, is in its outcome closely akin to the doctrines of the relativity of knowledge and of the unknowableness of the Absolute which were maintained by his predecessor. The two opposing tendencies of thought characterized as pantheism and deism are traced through modern philosophy, and criticised for their one-sidedness. Hegelianism is accused of identifying the Absolute with human experience, in its effort to avoid the opposite error of regarding the Absolute as something which does not and cannot reveal itself. Bradley's *Appearance and Reality* is treated as a reaction against such an identification, a protest against the reduction of the world to a set of logical categories, a recall of fellow-Hegelians from a too narrow humanism to an insight into the vastness of the sustaining Life that operates unspent throughout the universe; "a praiseworthy attempt to treat the life of the Absolute for itself as a reality, as the most real of realities." But Mr. Bradley is criticised in turn for rejecting knowledge, as relational, and falling back upon pure feeling for our best analogy in trying to realize the nature of the experience of the Absolute. This speculation leads, not to any higher or larger unity, but to the pit of undifferentiated sub-